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In  view of the prevailing ambiguities, impressionistic beliefs and perhaps distortions that shroud the contem- 
porary dehrrence theory and the various strategies of deterrence associated with it, this paper attempts to break 
fresh grounds, particularly in the area of threat credibility. By foausing the level of analysis somewhere between the 
individual persone?ity and socialstructures and thus using a social psychological approach, it attempts to explain the 
behaviour (as related to the credibility of deterrence threats) of national decision-makers, during aeute international 
crises. After analyzing and re-evaluating the relevant literature in the field, the paper presents a functional model 
of threat perception involving two opponents. The model takes into account such variables as : (1) basic human 
needs; (2) role of reference groups; (3) credibility and specificity of international threats; (4) leaders' intentions and 
predispositions; and (5) self-perception of threats. The major conclusions of the paper are: (1) no communicative 
means for influencing human behaviour are uniformally effective because of the problem of distortion of perception; 
and (2 )  the effects of the threat-induced fear on decision-makers' rationality cannot be taken for granted. In fact 
evidence suggests in most cases rationality under high fear is impaired because fear tenda to reduce the range of clues 
which are available for the consideration of the threatened party. 
The nuclear deterrence theories continue to be shrouded with ambiguities, imprassionis tic beliefs and 
perhaps distortions, particulally with regard to its all important ingredient, the concept of 'threat 
credibilityl'. Deterrence thinking has been structured on common sense beliefs and observations of how 
men and states behave under threats of punishment. These beliefs about aggression, percteption of 
threats, and the nature of man have recently received the attention of many investigators in both the 
physical and social sciences. 
In an interesting empirical study, Russett found that apart from the factor of military superiority, 
political and economic factor& are also of importance in deterring an aggressor2. A major road bloc in 
the development of a viable theory, particularly in the understanding of the concept of "threat," is the 
tendency for international relations scholars to continue to personify the state, attributing to it all those 
human qualities shared by mankind. 
A social-psychological approach to the concept of "threat credibility", crucial to a viable deterrence 
theory has been discussed by Herbert3, Katz4 and Waskow5. An attempt has been made in this paper to 
build a social-psychological model of deterrence threat in which the actors are states detined in terms of 
official decision-makers who do not behaye as discrete individuals but as participants in a given sooio- 
political-psychological setting. The concept of "threat" and the notion of 'deterrence' itself are analyzed 
and re-evaluated along with an analysis of some of the contemporary deteirenoe strategies6, preceding 
the presentation of the model. 
A N A L Y S I S  A N D  R E - E V A L U A T I O N  
Deterrence is the basic concept underpinning contemporary nuclear strategies. It is the simple notion 
that aggressive behaviour can be discouraged, prevented, or deterred by posing a threat that could lead to 
the imposition of severe sanctions on a would-be aggressor if he violates certain prescribed norma of 
behaviour. Deterrence in relation to power may be thought of as "the ability to prevent certain threats or 
actions from being carried out by posing an equivalent or greater threat7" or "Deterrence is concerned 
with the exploitation of potential force. It is concerned with persuading a potential enemy that he should 
in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity8". A key ingredient in deterrence theory is 'threat' 
which permits the exploitation of potential force and presumably persuades the enemy to modify if not 
altogether abandon his predicted behaviour. A deterrence threat ie also a conditional threat of punishment 
for an action, where both the specified action and carrying out of the threat are deemed undesirable to the 
'threatener'. Deterrence threats are not always ~uccessful as no oommunicative means for influencing human 
behaviour is uniformly effective under all conditions. Looking into all the aspects of the deterrence 
threats the practical question to be posed here is 'how can a government make its threat more effeotive?' 
The exception to this type of threat is a short-term threat or bluff which masks reality which is effective 
only for a short period till it is exposed and invalidates its credibilities. Hence a threat that is not effective 
cannot be credible, and if it is not credible it cannot deter. A threat will be credible if there is a reason to 
believe that the one who makes the threat is both able and willing to carry it out with a proof 
that he oan do so. 
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A threat, being credible, must be perceived, understood, and feared by the adversary and should 
invoke rational response. Rationality as defined in terms of self-interest, however, has its limitations. The 
theory has received much criticism on this point, and one must be extremely oautious upon relying entirely 
on the self-interest explanation of rational behaviouro. A threat induced fear may not neoessarily invoke 
a rational response. And, if it should be the caselo,ll that frequently the effects of fear are to impair 
rational thinking, then the theory is opened to further criticism. 
Mutual nuclear deterrence has posited a simple goal, to avoid nuclear war while at  the same time 
preventing major power encroachment upon smaller power,.. Deterrence theory maintains that this goal 
can be achieved by making a credible threat, but in response 'to what makes a threat credible several 
strategies of deterrence have been developed, each claiming credibility and each supposedly aimed at 
deterring possible aggression by threatening to make aggression "costly". The authors of these strategies 
share a basic faith that failure to adjust to the changing military political situation will lead to 
d~truct ion and chaos, whereas adoption of a 'good' strategy will stabilize the military situation and thus 
eventually lead to a reduction of tensions amongnations. In addition, there is a common assumption that 
national deoision-makers are functionally ratisnal, and therefore, a rational strategy is one which makes 
the oosts and risks to a potential enemy of launching an attack greater than his probable gainsl2. 
Deterrence strategists sharply disagree as to the level of response a nation should employ in retaliation 
against the enemy. 
Proponents of a "graduated deterrence" strategyl3,1* insist that the response must always be made 
at the same level as the attack. Raising the level of response runs the risk of creating an unstable situation 
by over-reaction, which may end in an all-out thermonuclear exchange while a lower level of response is 
also undesirable for it will fail to deter high level attacks. Adherents to the dootrine of 'massive 
retaliationls' the strategy of responding with thermonuclear weapons on population centres regardless of 
the level of attack, reject the graduateddeterrence plan as economically unfeasible. Maintaining sufficient 
capability to respond to all level would endanger the national ecollomy and threat of mamive retaliation is 
itself suffioient to deter attacks at  all levels. Another group of detefrence strategists agree that an 
all-out attack with thermonuclear weapons should be countered with a response at  the same level, but 
attacks at  all other levels must be met with tactical atomic weapons as far as poseible in order to maintain 
a "limited war" situation. No nation will actually carry through massive retaliation in response to a less 
drastic attack for fear .that the attacking nation will launch its own thermonuclear retaliati0n16,1~. 
\ 
Kahnls has argued quite bluntly that in order to minimize the probability of a nuclear war, a nation 
must, threaten and be prepared to go well beyond the finite doctrine associated with an invulnerable 
i~owitercity capacity, that is, to be fixed only for retaliatory purposes. He makes a case for a counter force, 
and hepce ,for a credible first-strike capability. Without the combination of strategy and capability one 
Oanhot, make a credible threat to deter the wide range of behavio7~r with which an adversary might be 
inclined to confront a state. A nation ought to engage in the sort of behaviour which is to deter the adversary, 
bht if ac tudy employed, would almost, certainly compel the nation to opt for a pre-emptive strike. The 
problem which could not be realized is that given the comlexity of contemporary international orieis 
situations, both the counter force capability and an elaborate oivil defence syetem that is recommended 
cannot help but give an overwhelming impression of a fixst-strike preparations rather than a retaliatory 
intention, On the other hand, one could ask, of what use is a large scale evacuation shelter programme if 
a nation i~ resigned to accepting the fixst below? It is difficult to escape the conclusion that to acquire 
the capabilities recommended by Kahn will almost certainly mean to generate a high degree of fear in the 
mind of the advezsary coupled with a rising expeotation on his part of a surprise attack. 
Schelling disagreeing with Kahn argues that a threat can be made credible if the adversary knows 
his behaviour will unalterably commit a country to a course of action that this country probably does not 
to take but cannot avoid. Schelling says "it involves confronting him (the adversary) with the evidence 
for believing that our behaviour will be determined by his behaviourlg". . 
Schelling & Halpern suggest that a nation can and must collaborate with the adversary to 
increase interdependency'o. International conflict is got and ~hould not be regarded as a pure zero-sum 
relationship, and between enem& there is always a modicum of cooperation sustained by a mutual 
realization that certain outcomea of tthezivalry can be mutually advantageous as well as catastrophic. Based 
on this premise, a strategy was developed which has come to be known as "finite or minimum deterrence." 
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It tdJi ,.for e non-provocative set of military capabilities and doctrines. M&t p&ioularly, both. sidea 
are admonished to opt only for a strike-back or a seoond~strike force, and Co eschew anything 
suggestive of a first-strike intent. 
There are dangers inherent in Schellug and Hdpem's approwh. Firs* of all, in order to adhere to 
,these self-denying stabilizing ordinances, a nation must create an 'invulnerable' retaliatorx capability. 
Having achieved this, a nation is to await any assault by the adveisary with impunity, knowing well that 
its cities and factories will be obliterated not only by the first strike it is hbnour-bound to faee, before 
starting anything on his own, but also by theinevitable retaliatory blow in response to its own retaliation. 
Secondly, the authors are assuming that a more or lesa self-imposed restraint in the research and 
development of &her new weapons will be exemised by both parties based on a mutual conviction that an 
attempt by one aide to get ahead of the other will trigger a re-armament race which is considered 
mutually disastrous. . 
In both Kahri's and Schelling's notions of an effective deterrence, military strength is emphasized at 
the expense of political and economic considerations. Russett argues that political and economic ties of 
interdependency between a defender and the defended1 is an important deterrence factor wbich no 
adversary is likely to overlook21. It is submitted that particular indices of political. and economic 
interdependence emphasized by Russett are perhaps of less significance here in themselves as compared 
to the indicators to whom Deutsch has often referred to as 'mutual sympathies and loyalties', the 'we 
feelingssa'. The preceding analysis of various strategies of deterrence as related to the question, what 
makes a theit oredible, indicate that scholars have frequently failed to broaden their investigation 
to include social-psychological variables in their search for a more viable theory of nuclear deterrence. 
The following social-psychologicd model is developed in an effort to remedy this situation. 
T H E  D E T E R R E N C E  T H R E A T - A  S O C I A L - P S Y C H O L O G I C A L  
M O D E L  
Major Aspects of the Model 
The model developed assumes that a state's foreign policy is primarily the product of extemsl 
threats which are perceived by its leaders. This assumption does not deny the importanae of domestic 
forces in shaping foreip policy-making. It simply emphasizes external threat perceptions, a basic 
assumption undergirding deterrence theory. 
Three major concepts intertwine throughout the model. The first is threat credibility (TC). The model 
seeks to explicate why one threat may be believed while another may not be believed. When a threat 
becomes oredible, it is largely dependent on the second concept-the 'threshold of threat perception'. 
It is assumed that no two aotors will perceive a given threat in ex9tly the same way. The level of threat 
perception is dependent on variables such as predispositions and physiological needs held by the 
threatened party a t  the time the threat is made. 
The third concept is the 'perceived immediate reality'. This concept encompasses the preceding two 
concepts as well aB the notions of political culture and objective reality. The perceived immediate 
reality is set in a particular political culture, a culture that makes each actor's behaviour unique in 
some respects. Objeotive reality is deiined as those activities and behaviour which are devoid of subjective 
interpretations. 
C O N S T R U C T S  A N D  V A R I A B L E S  
Actor : A single decision maker, the President or a collectivity of-decision makers. 
@G~'P : A group which helps the decision-maker but is without any official responsibility. 
Perceptual Bcreew : A 'black box' which filters and sorts incoming stimuli into an intel4ent world 
and whose working is not fully understood. 
Politiml Culture : The psychological dimension of a political system consisting of "attitudes, beliefs, 
values, and skills which are current' in an eutire population, as well a8 those special propensities and 
patterns which may be found within separate parts of 'that population24". 
Basic Needs : Wants, needs or drives that prodwe tension if not satisfied. 
Self-perception : It is how the aetor defines his role in a given setting which is tied olosdy to the 
personality vmiable and political d tu r e .  
Threat Capability : The objective factors which materially contribute to making a threat oredible. 
Predispositions : Trust, suspicion and tension leveL 
T H E  M O D E L  
The threat peroeption modelis structured about two actors A and B with eachhaving pemeptual screens 
(a) and (b) re~peotively (Fig. 1). Various stimuli inputs aro converted into threat perceptionoutput 
stimuli which form a cognitive pattern or image on the mind of the actor. 
To analyze the model, one can begin with the numerous inputs that feed into the percepzual screen. 
An indispensable input emanates from the basic needs. Taken as a whole, this input largely determines 
and regulates the threshold of threat perception. The threshold level varies according to t l e  strength of 
the derive8 produced by the baaic needs. It can be hypothesized that the greater the imbalance between the 
four postulated basic needs-physical, affective, self-esteem, and self-actualization-the higher the threshold 
of threat perception. In other words, it will take a much greater effort on the part of actor A to convey 
a threat to the second actor B. At the extreme, for example, one can say that an actor who has a dis- 
torted need for the satisfaction of self-esteem may well be invulnerable to an otherwise credible threat. In 
terms of rational behaviour, an irrational actor is not responsive to "rational" threats. 
A second complex of stimuli that flow into the perceptual screen may be categorized under the 
rubric of threat credibility (TC). As depi~t~ed in the model, two factors-capability and intentions (1)-me 
synthesized and resolved into a single output, which in turn, ie an input into the perceptual screen. The 
capability fact01 is embedded in objective reality as indicated by its position in the model. Intentions, on 
the other hand, are lodged in the perceived immediate reality. They may be composed of (1) actions that 
another state takes, andlor (2) statements made by the other actor. Two major hypotheses may be 
formulated with respect to threat credibility : 
Big. l-Threat perception model (BN-Basic needs; RG-Reference group TC-Threat Credibility, I-Inteneions, ST-Threat 
specificity, P-Predispositions, SP-Self-perception. -Threat perception 
A E ~ D  SHEIKH : Credibility of Deterrence Threats 
HIGHLY (i) As threat capability and intentions inorease, 
EFFECTIVE threat credibility increases too. Up to a certain 
EFFECTIVENESS point, capability supersedes intentions, there- 
RESPONSE after, intentions may be the more significant 
THREAT variable. 
INEFFECTIVE F E A R  
VERY SPECIFICITY VERY 
VAGUE OF THREAT SPECIFIC (ii) As threat credibility increases, threat percep- 
Fig. $-Anxiety, fear and the response to threat. ti0n h~rert~es.. 
The third array of input stimuli emanate from the respectiye actors' predispositions {P). These 
predispositions-trust, suspicion, and tension level-regulate the qualitative character of the incoming 
stimuli and iduence the threshold of threat perception. Trust and suspicion tend to be inversely 
correlated. As suspicion increases, trust decreases and may become transformed into dietrust. At the 
same time this is not always an isomoiphic relationship. Suspicion may oscillate considerably before 
distrust is manifested. In any event, the degree of trust or suspicion held by one actor tends to either dampen 
or amplify other stimuli inputs. In sum, it may be hypothesized that as the level of trust increases, threat 
credibility stimuli decreases. 
Tension level is another very important factor that regulates stimuli imputs. Temion is not a 
predisposition akin to those of trust or distrust, it is an ever present state that varies with time, setting, 
and threat spmiiicity (ST). In an exoellent discussion, Davies has outlined the relationship between tension 
level, threat spifhi ty ,  and responsiveness of the threatened aotor (Fig. 2). 
Tension significantly influences threat perception and the consequent behaviour. Psychologiml 
experimentation tends to confirm the hypothesis that as tension increases, a decision-maker tends to become 
more rigid and repetitive in his thinking and behaviour28. Furthermore, the threat is qagnified and may 
oause dysfuwtionrtl behaviour (this is the point on the curve in Fig. 2 where fear prevds). Psychological 
experimentation also supports the hypothesis that as tension increases, a decision-maker tends to 
oversimplify the problem. Once again the propensity for distorting a threat is high. 
The last component in the model that requires some explanation is self-perception (SP) (the 
dotted line extending from the actor to the perceptual screen). This variable acts as a boundary. 
ciroumsaribing the perimeters within which the other stimuli must fit. It is the ego reinforoin@; meohanisms 
When there is an inoongruenoe between self perception and other stimuli in the perceptual screen, threat 
peroeption beoomes muddled and may cause gross perception e m .  The actor may oveteetimate the 
threat or underestimate it, in either case, a serious mistake may ensue. 
O O N C L U S I O N  
The model outlined in Fig. 1 is a composite set of ideas developed on the subject. An attempt has 
been made to integrate the various approaches into a model of threat perception. The model is orientated 
to threat's with spec& attention directed to deterreace theory. Specifioally, an effort bas been made to 
synthesize sooial and psychologioal perspectives. 
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